IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF KNOX COUNTY, ILLINOIS
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

JANE DOE, *et al., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,* Plaintiffs, v. KNOX COLLEGE, Defendant.	Case No. 2023LA9

PLAINTIFFS' UNOPPOSED MOTION AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS, EXPENSES, AND SERVICE AWARDS

INTRODUCTION

In this putative class action, Plaintiffs Jane Doe, Rachael Morrissey, Le'Andra Mosely, and Catherine Peck ("Plaintiffs") allege that their personally identifiable information ("PII") and personal health information ("PHI") were stolen by hackers as a result of Defendant Knox College ("Defendant") failing to take proper precautions in the storage of that PII and PHI. Defendant denies these and all allegations of wrongdoing and represents that it is agreeing to settle this litigation to avoid the uncertainties and expenses associated with ongoing litigation. After months of settlement discussions and informal discovery, the Parties mediated this action with the Hon. Morton Denlow (ret.) of JAMS, an experienced and well-respected class action mediator, and reached a proposed settlement ("Settlement" or "Agreement") that creates a non-reversionary Settlement Fund of $462,500, which will be used to pay approved class member claims, notice and administration costs, service awards to the Plaintiffs, and attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses to Class Counsel. If approved, the Settlement will bring certainty, closure, and significant and valuable relief for individuals and void what otherwise would likely be contentious and costly litigation regarding Defendant's alleged failure to protect Plaintiffs' and Class Members' PII and PHI.

Plaintiffs and Class Counsel respectfully request that the Court approve Service Awards of $3,000 to each of the four Representative Plaintiffs (*i.e.*, $12,000 in total) and a Fee Award of thirty-five percent (35%) of the Settlement Fund (*i.e.*, $161,875.00) and litigation expenses of $12,222.27. As detailed below, the requested awards are appropriate under governing Illinois law, consistent with the amounts awarded in similar settlements, and fairly compensate Class Counsel and Representative Plaintiffs for the work they performed and the commendable result they achieved in this high-risk litigation.

I. BACKGROUND OF THE LITIGATION

A. Overview Of The Litigation

On January 20, 2023, Plaintiff Jane Doe filed a Class Action Complaint against the Defendant (Case No. 4:23-cv-04012 (N.D. Ill.)), which was subsequently consolidated with two other actions, *Morrissey v. Knox College*, (Case No. 4:23-cv-04019 (N.D. Ill.)) and *Mosley v. Knox College, Inc.*, (Case No. 4:23-cv-04023 (N.D. Ill.)). On March 16, 2023 a Consolidated Complaint was filed, styled *Jane Doe, et al., v. Knox College*, 4:23-cv-04012-SLD-JEH, in which Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant failed to properly secure and safeguard the Private Information of Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Members.

Shortly after the cases were consolidated, the Parties agreed to discuss a potential resolution of this Lawsuit. The Parties engaged in hard-fought, arm's-length negotiations and ultimately, on April 24, 2023, the Parties agreed to the terms of a settlement during a mediation session with the Hon. Morton Denlow (Ret.). The parties agreed to seek settlement in this Court, and on May 10, 2023, the consolidated action was subsequently refiled as *Doe et al. v. Knox College,* Case No. 2023LA9, Knox County Circuit Court in the Ninth Judicial Circuit, State of Illinois.

On August 17, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of the Settlement, and on September 21, 2023, the Court granted that Motion and preliminarily approved the Settlement.

B. Summary Of The Settlement

The Settlement provides an exceptional result for the Class by delivering a non-reversionary fund of $462,500.00 to Class Members, which will include costs of settlement administration, service awards, and attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses. Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 69, 130, 134. Class Members can receive a cash payment of $100.00 (the "Alternative Cash Payment") or, instead, may choose credit monitoring, compensation for unreimbursed economic losses up to $2,500.00, and/or compensation for lost time at $25.00 per hour up to four hours, for a maximum of $100.00. Settlement Agreement ¶ 73. With the exception of compensation for unreimbursed economic losses, which requires documentation such as receipts, Settlement Class Members submitting such claims need only attest to the information on the claim form. *Id.* Approved Claims for Settlement Benefits will be increased or decreased *pro rata* based on the amount remaining in the Net Settlement Fund and depending on the number of claimants. Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 54, 75, 85.

ARGUMENT

I. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS, AND EXPENSES ARE REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE APPROVED

"Illinois follows the 'American Rule,' which provides that absent statutory authority or a contractual agreement, each party must bear its own attorney fees and costs." *McNiff v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc.*, 384 Ill. App. 3d 401, 405 (4th Dist. 2008) (quoting *Negro Nest, L.L.C. v. Mid-Northern Mgmt., Inc.*, 362 Ill. App. 3d 640, 641-2 (4th Dist. 2005)) (quotations omitted). "If a statute or contractual agreement expressly authorizes an award of attorney fees, the court

may award fees 'so long as they are reasonable.'" *Id.* (citing and quoting *Career Concepts, Inc. v. Synergy, Inc.*, 372 Ill. App. 3d 395, 405 (1st Dist. 2007)). Here, the Parties have entered into a contractual agreement – the Settlement Agreement – expressly authorizing an award of attorney fees, costs, and expenses up to 35% of the $462,500 settlement fund, or $161,875.00.[1] Settlement Agreement ¶ 69.

II. THE COURT SHOULD APPLY THE PERCENTAGE-OF-THE-FUND METHOD IN THIS CASE

"When awarding attorney's fees in a class action, a court must make sure that counsel is fairly compensated for the amount of work done as well as for the results achieved." *Brundidge v. Glendale Fed. Bank, F.S.B.*, 168 Ill. 2d 235, 244 (1995). "The decision to award fees based on the lodestar or percentage method is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, considering the particular facts and circumstances of each case." *Id.* However, the Court is not required to perform a lodestar cross-check on Class Counsel's fees. *Shaun Fauley, Sabon, Inc. v.*

[1] *See* William B. Rubenstein, 5 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 15:12 (5th ed. 2019) (parties to suit may have private agreements concerning fees which may include agreement between class counsel and defendant whereby defendant agrees to pay a certain fee requested by class counsel); *see also Evans v. Jeff D.*, 475 U.S. 717, 738 n.30 (1986) (parties may simultaneously negotiate a "defendant's liability on the merits and his liability for his opponents' attorney's fees"); *In re Nutella Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig.*, 589 F. App'x 53, 60 (3d Cir. 2014) (awarding $500,000 in fees for injunctive class settlement where defendant agreed to change its misleading labels); *Wing v. Asacro Inc.*, 114 F.3d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 1997) ("At the outset, we note that the fee dispute in this case arises [not from a statute or common fund, but] out of a contract: in the Settlement Agreement, Asacro agreed to pay the reasonable attorney fees and expenses as determined and awarded by the court."); *Weinberger v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp.*, 925 F.2d 518, 523 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that when parties to class actions have reached a "clear sailing" fee-shifting agreement as part of settlement, trial court may determine and award reasonable fees "even where no fee-shifting statute of common law exception thrives"); *Browne v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc.*, No. CV 09-06750 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2010) ("A settlement agreement is a binding contract" and "contractual provisions providing for the payment of attorneys' fees … provide a basis for awarding fees."); *In re TJX Cos. Retail Secs. Breach Litig.*, 584 F. Supp. 2d 395, 399 (D. Mass. 2008) (noting that basis for awarding fees was "part of the Agreement, [in which Defendant] agreed to pay court-approved attorneys' fees not to exceed $6,500,000"); *Deloach v. Philip Morris Cos.*, 2003 WL 2304907, at *4 n.2 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 19, 2003) ("[T]he present petition [for attorney fees] was brought pursuant to a private [settlement] agreement among the parties.") (citation omitted); *Neel v. Strong*, 114 S.W.3d 272, 273 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) ("As part of the settlement, the Attorney General and the tobacco companies agreed that the tobacco companies would pay the fees of the outside counsel.").

Metro. Life Ins. Co., 2016 IL App (2d) 150236, ¶ 58, 52 N.E.3d 427, 441 (citing *Brundidge,* 168 Ill.2d at 246) (rejecting an objector's argument that the trial court was required to perform a lodestar cross-check on class counsel's fees and awarding class counsel fees totaling 33% of the common fund, or $7,600,000); *Perez v. Rash Curtis & Associates*, 2020 WL 1904533, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2020) ("Generally, a district court is 'not required' to conduct a lodestar cross-check to assess the reasonableness of a fee award."). Indeed, the "[p]ercentage analysis approach eliminates the need for additional major litigation and further taxing of scarce judicial resources." *Ryan v. City of Chicago*, 274 Ill. App. 3d 913, 924–25 (1st Dist. 1995). "Accordingly, most federal circuits … have abandoned the lodestar in favor of a percentage fee in common fund cases." *Id.*

In "choosing between the percentage and lodestar approaches," courts "look to the calculation method most commonly used in the marketplace at the time such a negotiation would have occurred." *Kolinek v. Walgreen Co.*, 311 F.R.D. 483, 500-01 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (citing *Cook v. Niedert*, 142 F.3d 1004, 1013 (7th Cir. 1998)); *see also McKinnie v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.*, 678 F. Supp. 2d 806, 814-15 (E.D. Wis. 2009). In class action litigation, where "the normal practice [is] to negotiate a fee arrangement based on a percentage of the plaintiffs' ultimate recovery," *Kolinek*, 311 F.R.D. at 500-01, state and federal courts in Illinois and throughout the country are in near unanimous agreement that the percentage-of-the-fund approach best yields the fair market price for the services provided by counsel to the class. *See Kirchoff v. Flynn*, 786 F.2d 320, 324 (7th Cir. 2006) ("When the prevailing method of compensating lawyers for similar services is the contingent fee, then the contingent fee *is* the 'market rate.'"); *Ryan v. City of Chicago*, 274 Ill. App. 3d 913, 923 (1st Dist. 1995) (noting that "a percentage fee was the best determinant of the reasonable value of services rendered by

counsel in common fund cases") (citation omitted); *In re Continental Illinois Securities Litig.*, 962 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir. 1992) (market for legal services paid on a contingency basis shows the proper percentage to apply in a class action that creates a common fund for the benefit of the class)); *Williams v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease*, 94 C 7410, 1995 WL 765266, *9 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 26, 1995) (noting that "[t]he approach favored in the Seventh Circuit is to compute attorney's fees as a percentage of the benefit conferred upon the class"); *see also, e.g., Gaskill v. Gordon*, 160 F.3d 361, 363 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that where "a class suit produces a fund for the class," as is the case here, "it is commonplace to award the lawyers for the class a percentage of the fund," and affirming fee award of 38% of $20 million recovery to class) (citing *Blum v. Stenson*, 465 U.S. 886, 900 n.16 (1984)); *Sutton v. Bernard*, 504 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2007) (directing district court on remand to consult the market for legal services so as to arrive at a reasonable percentage of the common fund recovered); *In re Capital One Tel. Consumer Prot. Act Litig.*, 80 F. Supp. 3d 781, 794 (N.D. Ill. 2015) ("[T]he court agrees with Class Counsel that the fee award … should be calculated as a percentage of the money recovered for the class.").

This Court should likewise apply the percentage-of-the-fund method. The percentage-of-the-fund method best replicates the *ex ante* market value of the services that Class Counsel provided to the Settlement Class. It is not just the typical method used in contingency-fee cases generally, *see Gaskill*, 160 F.3d at 363, but it is also the means by which an informed Settlement Class and Class Counsel would have established counsel's fee *ex ante*, at the outset of the litigation. *See Kolinek*, 311 F.R.D. at 500-01 ("[T]he normal practice [is] to negotiate a fee arrangement based on a percentage of the plaintiffs' ultimate recovery[.]"). The percentage-of-the-fund method also better aligns Class Counsel's interests with those of the Settlement Class because it bases the fee on the results the lawyers achieve for their clients rather than on the

number of motions they file, documents they review, or hours they work, and it avoids some of the problems the lodestar-times-multiplier method can foster (such as encouraging counsel to delay resolution of the case when an early resolution may be in their clients' best interests). *Brundidge*, 168 Ill.2d at 242; *Florin v. Nationsbank of Georgia, N.A.*, 34 F.3d 560, 566 (7th Cir. 1994); *In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig.*, 264 F.3d 712 at 720-21 (7th Cir. 2001). And it is also simpler to apply. *Id.*; *see also, e.g., Kolinek*, 311 F.R.D. at 501 (percentage of the ultimate recovery method appropriate for awarding fees in TCPA class action "because fee arrangements based on the lodestar method require plaintiffs to monitor counsel and ensure that counsel are working efficiently on an hourly basis, something a class of nine million lightly-injured plaintiffs likely would not be interested in doing"); *Ryan*, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 924.

Accordingly, the Court should apply the percentage-of-the-fund method.

A. The Requested Attorneys' Fees, Costs, And Expenses Are Reasonable As A Percentage Of The Class Benefit

In class action settlements, courts typically award attorneys' fees based on a percentage of the total settlement, which includes any litigation expenses incurred. *Brundidge*, 168 Ill. 2d at 238. "[T]he percentage of the fund method … reflects the results achieved." *Id.* at 244; *see Taubenfeld v. AON Corp.,* 415 F.3d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 2005) (approving fees of 33% of total settlement, noting "thirteen cases in the Northern District of Illinois where counsel was awarded fees amounting to 30–39% of the settlement fund").

An award to Class Counsel of 35% of the Settlement Fund is well within the range of fees typically awarded to class counsel by Illinois courts in comparable class action settlements. *See, e.g., Retsky Family Ltd. P'ship v. Price Waterhouse LLP*, No. 97-cv-7694, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20397, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2001) (noting that a "customary contingency fee" ranges "from 33 1/3% to 40% of the amount recovered") (citing *Kirchoff v. Flynn*, 786 F.2d 320, 324 (7th Cir.

1986)); *Schulte v. Fifth Third Bank*, 805 F. Supp. 2d 560, 599 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (same); *Meyenburg v. Exxon Mobil Corp.*, No. 05-cv-15, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52962, at *5 (S.D. Ill. July 31, 2006) ("33 1/3% to 40% (plus the cost of litigation) is the standard contingent fee percentages in this legal marketplace for comparable commercial litigation"); *see also, e.g., Sabon, Inc.*, 2016 IL App (2d) 150236, at ¶ 59 (upholding an attorneys' fees award of one-third of a reversionary fund recovered in light of the "substantial risk in prosecuting this case under a contingency fee agreement given the vigorous defense of the case and defenses asserted by [the defendant]").

Here, the requested $161,875.00 fee is 35% of the Settlement Fund generated on behalf of the class, which falls within the range awarded in class actions by courts throughout the country. As aforementioned, courts have recognized that fee awards as high as 50% of the gross settlement fund are reasonable. *See* NEWBURG ON CLASS ACTIONS, *supra*, §15:83 (5th ed. Dec. 2016 update) ("Usually, 50 percent of the fund is the upper limit on a reasonable fee award from a common fund, … though somewhat larger percentages are not unprecedented."); *Wells v. Allstate Ins. Co.,* 557 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7-8 (D.D.C 2008) (noting that fee awards may range up to 45%, and approving fee request of 45% of the total gross recovery); *In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig.,* 526 F. Supp. 494, 499 (D.D.C. 1981) (awarding 45% of $7.3 million gross settlement fund as attorneys' fees); *see also Martin v. AmeriPride Servs, Inc.,* 2011 WL 2313604, at *8 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2011) ("Other case law surveys suggest that 50% is the upper limit, with 30-50% commonly being awarded in cases in which the common fund is relatively small."). The requested fee of 35% of the Settlement Fund is reasonable in light of the substantial monetary relief obtained by Class Counsel here – despite significant risk – and should be awarded.

"When assessing the reasonableness of fees, a trial court may consider a variety of

factors, including the nature of the case, the case's novelty and difficulty level, the skill and standing of the attorney, the degree of responsibility required, the usual and customary charges for similar work, and the connection between the litigation and the fees charged." *McNiff,* 384 Ill. App. 3d at 407 (quoting *Richardson v. Haddon*, 375 Ill. App. 3d 312, 314-15 (1st Dist. 2007)) (quotations omitted). Here, each of these factors shows the requested fee is reasonable.

a. *Plaintiffs' Claims Carried Substantial Litigation Risk*

As detailed above, this case presented substantial litigation risk. *See supra* Introduction. Nonetheless, despite knowing the risks, Class Counsel took on the case, worked on the case, and even undertook a significant financial risk, with no upfront payment, and no guarantee of payment absent a successful outcome. In addition to attorney time spent on the case, Class Counsel also advanced $12,222.27 in out-of-pocket expenses[2], again with no guarantee of repayment. If the case had advanced through class certification, these expenses would have increased many-fold, and Class Counsel would have been required to advance these expenses potentially for several years to litigate this action through judgment and appeals.

Even if the claims survived after the pending appeals are decided, Defendant would have contested class certification, and Plaintiffs would have faced serious risks even before getting to class certification. Defendant most certainly would have sought summary judgment, as well as engaged in extensive and protracted discovery.

Despite these risks, the Settlement Agreement allows Class Members to submit claims for credit monitoring, up to four hours of lost time reimbursable at a rate of $25 per hour, up to$100.00, and up to $2,500 in unreimbursed out-of-pocket losses, or, alternately, a cash payment of $100.00 per Settlement Class Member. With the exception of unreimbursed out-of-

[2] The Settlement Agreement provides that Class Counsel may seek up to $20,000.00 from the Settlement Fund for litigation expenses. *See* ¶ 134.

pocket losses, Settlement Class Members submitting such claims need only attest to the information on the claim form.

This is an excellent result as compared to other data breach settlements in Illinois. *See, e.g. McNicholas et al. v. Illinois Gastroenterology Group, P.L.L.C.*, Case No. 22-LA-173, Cir. Ct. Lake Cty. (approving 36.4% of the settlement in attorneys' fees); *Hestrup et al. v. DuPage Medical Group, Ltd.*, Case No. 2021-L-937, Cir. Ct. DuPage Cty. (approving 33.3% of the settlement fund in attorneys' fees); *Lhota et al. v. Michigan Ave. immediate Care, S.C.*, Case No. 2022-CH-06616, Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. (approving 35% of the settlement fund in attorneys' fees).

b. *The Skill And Standing Of The Attorneys Supports The Requested Fee*

The attorneys handling this case are in good standing in their respective jurisdictions. Class Counsel are well-respected attorneys with significant experience litigating similar class action cases in federal and state courts across the country, including other data breach cases. *See* Declaration of Carl V. Malmstrom in Support of Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, Exhibits 4-6 (firm resumes of Class Counsel).

Furthermore, "[t]he quality of the opposition should be taken into consideration in assessing the quality of the plaintiffs' counsel's performance." *In re MetLife Demutalization Litig.*, 689 F. Supp. 2d 297, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). Here, Defendant was represented by the prominent and well-respected law firm of Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP. Class Counsel achieved an exceptional result in this case while facing well-resourced and experienced defense counsel. *See In re Marsh ERISA Litig.*, 265 F.R.D. 128, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("The high quality of defense counsel opposing Plaintiffs' efforts further proves the caliber of representation that was necessary to achieve the Settlement.").

c. *The Settlement Was The Result Of Arms'-Length Negotiations Between The Parties After A Significant Exchange Of Information*

This action required considerable skill and experience to bring it to such a successful conclusion. The case required investigation of factual circumstances, the ability to develop creative legal theories, and the skill to respond to a host of legal defenses. In taking on this case, Class Counsel undertook the large responsibility of pursuing claims on behalf of a class of purchasers of a consumer product against a manufacturer and experienced defense counsel. Class Counsel also undertook the large responsibility of funding this case, without any assurance that they would recover those costs. Class Counsel not only took on the obligation to act on behalf of the Plaintiffs, but also the class as a whole.

Class Counsel worked with Defendant's Counsel to gather critical information in advance of the mediations, including the size and scope of the putative class. The Parties also engaged in pre-mediation discovery and exchanged detailed mediation statements airing their respective legal arguments. On April 24, 2023, the Parties participated in a mediation with Judge Denlow of JAMS, which ultimately led to an agreement. Through the undertaking of a thorough investigation, informal discovery, and substantial arm's-length negotiations, Class Counsel obtained a settlement that provides a real and significant monetary benefit to the Class. Since that time, Class Counsel has moved for preliminary approval, applied for attorneys' fees, and diligently monitored the successful notice program and claims administration process.

Defendant is represented by highly experienced attorneys who have made clear that absent a settlement, they were prepared to continue their vigorous defense of this case and oppose class certification. Even assuming a class was certified, and summary judgment defeated, the case would then have moved on to pretrial briefing, a pretrial conference, and then a jury trial, which would have been costly, time-consuming, and very risky for Class Members

and for counsel. Class Counsel undertook this representation understanding that the risk of losing on class certification, or summary judgment, or at trial were significant. But for this settlement, Defendant likely would have opposed class certification and moved for summary judgment, resulting in rounds of briefing and a risk of summary judgment and denial of class certification.

d. *The Usual And Customary Charges For Similar Work*

When Class Counsel undertakes major litigation such as this, it necessarily limits their ability to undertake other complex litigation cases. During the course of this litigation, Class Counsel devoted significant time and resources to succeed in this case. To date, Class Counsel incurred out-of-pocket costs and expenses in the amount of $12,222.27 in prosecuting this litigation on behalf of the Class. Each of these expenses was necessarily and reasonably incurred to bring this case to a successful conclusion, and they reflect market rates for various categories of expenses incurred. Class Counsel had to make this commitment at the outset of this case without knowing how long the case would take to resolve, if ever. Therefore, Class Counsel's willingness to prosecute this action on a contingent fee basis and to advance costs diverted the time and resources expended on this action from other cases.

Further, as detailed above, the requested fees, costs, and expenses of 35% of the settlement fund is well within the market range. *See supra* cases cited in Argument §§ I.A-B. And, indeed, courts customarily award 35% or more in fees in class actions settlements. *See*, *e.g.*, *Retsky Family Ltd. P'ship v. Price Waterhouse LLP*, 2001 WL 1568856, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2001) (noting that a "customary contingency fee" ranges "from 33 1/3% to 40% of the amount recovered"); *Sekura v. L.A. Tan Enterprises, Inc.*, No. 2015-CH-16694 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty., Ill. 2016) (awarding a 40% fee in BIPA class settlement); *Zepeda v. Intercontinental*

Hotels Group, Inc., No. 2018-CH-02140 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty., Ill. 2018) (same); *Cowen v. Lenny & Larry's, Inc*., 2019 WL 10892150, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 2, 2019) (awarding a 34.4% fee in a false advertising class settlement relating to nutritional content of food products); *Adkins v. Nestle Purina PetCare Co.*, 2015 WL 10892070, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 2015) (awarding a 33% fee in a false advertising class settlement relating to defective chicken jerky dog treats); *see also, e.g., Shaun Fauley, Sabon, Inc. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.*, 2016 IL App (2d) 150236 at ¶ 59, (upholding an attorneys' fees award of one-third of a reversionary fund recovered in light of the "substantial risk in prosecuting this case under a contingency fee agreement given the vigorous defense of the case and defenses asserted by [the defendant]").

III. THE REQUESTED SERVICE AWARDS ARE REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE APPROVED

A service award of $3,000.00 for each Representative Plaintiff is appropriate here. "In some cases, the amount requested as an service award, given the court's knowledge about the advanced stage of the case or other procedural facts, will be so obviously reasonable that only minimal scrutiny will be required for approval, at least in the absence of any objection, from class member." 299 F.R.D. 160 at NACA Guideline 5. Defendant has agreed to pay service awards to Plaintiffs in the amount of $3,000 each as part of the Settlement Agreement. Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 130, 131. Courts routinely approve service awards to compensate named plaintiffs for the services they provide and the risks they incur during the course of class action litigation. *See* 299 F.R.D. 160, NACA Guideline 5 (West 2014) ("Consumers who represent an entire class should be compensated reasonably when their efforts are successful and compensation would not present a conflict of interest."); *see also Cook,* 142 F.3d 1004 (value of settlement was $14 million; service award to class representative of $25,000); *see also In re Remeron End-Payor Antitrust Litig.*, No. Civ. 02-2007 FSH, 2005 WL 2230314 (D.N.J. Sept. 13,

2005) (value of settlement was $36 million; service awards totaling $75,000 for six named plaintiffs). "Many cases note the public policy reasons for encouraging individuals with small personal stakes to serve as class plaintiffs in meritorious cases." 299 F.R.D. 160, Guideline 5 Discussion (citing cases).

This case is no different. Plaintiffs' participation has been instrumental in the prosecution and ultimate settlement of this action. Here, Plaintiffs spent substantial time on this action, including by: (i) assisting with the investigation of this action and the drafting of the complaint, (ii) being in contact with counsel frequently, and (iii) staying informed of the status of the action, including settlement.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs and Class Counsel respectfully request that the Court approve a service award to Plaintiffs of $3,000 each, approve an award of attorneys' fees, of 35% of the Settlement Fund, or $161,875.00 to Class Counsel, and approve Class Counsel's request for $12,222.27 in reasonable costs and expenses. The requested awards would both adequately reward and reasonably compensate Class Counsel and Plaintiffs for assuming the significant risks that this case presented at the outset and nonetheless expending a substantial amount of time and other resources investigating, litigating, and negotiating a resolution to the case for the benefit of the Settlement Class.

Dated: December 8, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ *Carl V. Malmstrom*

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